Η ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΚΟΡΥΦΗΣ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΥ-KISSINGER ΣΤΙΣ 2 ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ 1974 ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΥΣ ΜΥΘΟΥΣ

Του Λεωνίδα Λεωνίδου  

Συγγραφέως – Ερευνητού

Στις 2 Οκτωβρίου 1974, έξι περίπου εβδομάδες μετά την ολοκλήρωση της δεύτερης στρατιωτικής, επεκτατικής και εγκληματικής επιχείρησης των Τούρκων, ο Μακάριος είχε άλλη κατ’ ιδίαν συνάντηση, μεταξύ της 11:25 και 12:45, με τον Αμερικανό Υπουργό Εξωτερικών και Βοηθό του Προέδρου των ΗΠΑ για θέματα Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, Henry Kissinger. Ο τρίτος παρών στη συνάντηση ήταν ο πρακτικογράφος Peter Rodman, από το προσωπικό του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφάλειας (NSC). Από τα όσα λέχθηκαν στη συνάντηση αυτή, σύμφωνα με το σχετικό απόρρητο έγγραφο, το οποίο αποχαρακτηρίστηκε 30 χρόνια μετά, προκύπτουν συγκλονιστικά νέα στοιχεία τόσο για το πραξικόπημα όσο και για την τουρκική εισβολή που ακολούθησε (Έγγραφα Kissinger, Πλαίσιο CL 272, Μνημόνια Συζητήσεων, Χρονολογικό αρχείο. Απόρρητο. Η συνάντηση πραγματοποιήθηκε στη σουίτα του υπουργού (Kissinger) στο Waldorf Towers).

Η συνάντηση αυτή Μακαρίου και Kissinger έγινε, όταν οι Τούρκοι είχαν ήδη καταλάβει την Κερύνεια, τη Μόρφου, τη Μεσαορία, την Καρπασία, τα πλείστα Κοκκινοχώρια και το Βαρώσι, μια έκταση περίπου 38% του κυπριακού εδάφους. Η αιματηρή και βάρβαρη τουρκική στρατιωτική εισβολή στοίχισε τη ζωή πέραν των 5.000 Ελληνοκυπρίων, με εκατοντάδες αγνοούμενους και 180.000 πρόσφυγες.

Μόλις τότε ο Μακάριος είχε συνειδητοποιήσει την πλάνη στην οποία βρέθηκε, ότι, δηλαδή, οι Τούρκοι με την εισβολή θα τον επανάφεραν στην εξουσία και την παγίδα των Βρετανών να δώσει τη συγκατάθεσή του και να ασκήσει δριμείς δημόσιες κατηγορίες ενάντια στη στρατιωτική κυβέρνηση της Ελλάδας.

Από τα πρακτικά της συνάντησης προκύπτουν τα εξής αποκαλυπτικά στοιχεία:

1) Ο Μακάριος είχε ενημερωθεί εκ των προτέρων για το επικείμενο πραξικόπημα εναντίον του, αλλά αγνόησε την προειδοποίηση.

"Kissinger: Μου είπαν ότι η Μακαριότητά σας είχε ενημερωθεί γι’ αυτό.

Μακάριος: Υπήρχαν δημόσιες αναφορές ότι την τελευταία στιγμή η CIA έλαβε πληροφορίες, αλλά δεν υπήρχε αρκετός χρόνος για να προσεγγιστεί κάποιος στην Ελλάδα να σταματήσει το πραξικόπημα. Αλλά αυτό είναι πολύ διαφορετικό από αυτό που δημοσιεύθηκε στη Le Mond ότι η CIA έκανε το πραξικόπημα. Αυτό δεν ήταν προς το συμφέρον των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών.

Kissinger: Αυτό είναι γελοίο.

Μακάριος: "Έτσι, η συνέντευξη στην Le Monde δεν ήταν αληθής".

2) Η πρώτη φορά που ο Kissinger άκουσε για πραξικόπημα ήταν το πρωί της Δευτέρας μετά τη διεξαγωγή του στις 15 Ιουλίου 1974.

"Kissinger: Σας είπα ότι… ήσασταν η καλύτερη λύση για το νησί. Νομίζετε ότι τον Ιούνιο ή τον Ιούλιο, όταν είχαμε έναν Πρόεδρο που εξαναγκαζόταν να παραιτηθεί, θα παρεμβαίναμε εναντίον σας;… Είχαμε αναφορές για πραξικοπήματα κάθε τρεις μήνες. Τι έκανε η Μακαριότητά σας εναντίον μας; Δεν είχαμε αντιφατικές αντιρρήσεις για το τι συνέβαινε. Η πρώτη φορά που άκουσα για πραξικόπημα ήταν το πρωί της Δευτέρας μετά τη διεξαγωγή του".

3) Ο Kissinger είπε στον Μακάριο ότι δεν είχε αντιμακαριακά αισθήματα:

"Δεν είμαστε αντιμακαριακοί… Σίγουρα δεν είμαστε αντιμακαριακοί. Ούτε επιμένουμε να είστε φιλοαμερικανοί. Ήμασταν απόλυτα ικανοποιημένοι με την κατάσταση, πριν από το πραξικόπημα. Η καλύτερη λύση ήταν να αφήσουμε την Κύπρο μόνη της. Αν ήξερα για το πραξικόπημα, θα το σταματούσα. Είχαμε μια καλή συζήτηση, όταν συναντηθήκαμε στην Κύπρο τον Μάιο… Δεν είχαμε κανένα πιθανό αμερικανικό ενδιαφέρον. Δεν είχαμε τίποτα εναντίον του Μακαρίου…

4) Ο Μακάριος δηλώνει ότι «ούτε οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ούτε η CIA είχαν οποιαδήποτε ανάμιξη στο πραξικόπημα εναντίον του":

"Μακάριος: Πρώτον, πρέπει να καταστήσω σαφές ότι ποτέ δε συμμερίστηκα την άποψη ότι οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες ή η CIA είχαν οποιαδήποτε ανάμειξη στο πραξικόπημα εναντίον μου.

Kissinger: Σας δίνω τον λόγο μου.

Μακάριος: Και αυτό που έγραψε η Le Monde δεν ανταποκρίνεται σε όσα είπα. Δεν είχα συνέντευξη με τον κ. Eric Rouleau, απλά μια συζήτηση. Δε με ρώτησε, αν η CIA συμμετείχε, αλλά, αν η CIA ήξερε εκ των προτέρων. Είπα ότι δεν ήξερα, αν ήξεραν εκ των προτέρων για ένα πραξικόπημα τη συγκεκριμένη ημέρα. Είχατε πληροφορίες ότι δεν μπορούσε να αποκλειστεί το ενδεχόμενο πραξικοπήματος".

5) Ο Kissinger είπε ότι οι ΗΠΑ δεν είχαν κάνει καμία δήλωση εναντίον του Σαμψών, επειδή «όσο πιο πολύ κατηγορούσαν τον Σαμψών, τόσο πιο βέβαιο ήταν ότι οι Τούρκοι θα έκαναν εισβολή». Αυτή η στάση ήταν εντελώς αντίθετη με εκείνη που πήρε ο Μακάριος, ο οποίος με τις δημόσιες καυστικές επιθέσεις του εναντίον της Ελληνικής Στρατιωτικής Κυβέρνησης από τις 16 μέχρι τις 19 Ιουλίου, με τις δηλώσεις του περί εξωτερικής εισβολής από την Ελλάδα, τις προειδοποιήσεις του ότι κινδύνευαν όχι μόνο οι Ελληνοκύπριοι, αλλά και οι Τουρκοκύπριοι και ότι καμία συμφωνία δεν μπορούσε να επέλθει με το νέο καθεστώς, έδωσαν όχι μόνο νομική κάλυψη, αλλά και ώθηση στην Τουρκία να εισβάλει.

Δίνει, δηλαδή, έμμεσα, ο διάσημος και πανούργος Αμερικανός Υπουργός Εξωτερικών ένα μάθημα εξωτερικής πολιτικής και διπλωματίας στον Μακάριο.

6) Ο Kissinger είπε ότι "οι Ευρωπαίοι ενθάρρυναν τους Τούρκους να εισβάλλουν, για ηλίθιους συναισθηματικούς λόγους!". Είναι, όμως, γνωστό ότι το κράτος της Ευρώπης που είχε άμεση ανάμιξη στην κατάσταση μετά το πραξικόπημα ήταν η Βρετανία. Το τι ξεκαθάρισε επομένως ο Kissinger στον Μακάριο ήταν ότι "οι Βρετανοί ενεθάρρυναν τους Τούρκους να εισβάλλουν, για ηλίθιους συναισθηματικούς λόγους!".

7) Ο Μακάριος είπε ότι δε θα υπέγραφε διζωνική λύση, αλλά "αν ο Κληρίδης και η Ελληνική Κυβέρνηση θεωρούσαν ότι ήταν η μόνη λύση, δε θα δημιουργούσε πρόβλημα". Επομένως, εκείνο που ενδιέφερε τον Μακάριο δεν ήταν η μορφή λύσης και οι συνέπειές της για τον λαό του, αλλά ποιος θα την υπέγραφε!

8) Ο Μακάριος ζήτησε από τον Kissinger να ασκήσει πίεση στην Τουρκία για υποχωρήσεις αλλά ο Kissinger απάντησε ότι η πολιτική των απειλών και εκβιασμών προς την Τουρκία δε θα έφερε αποτέλεσμα.

https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2026/7/22/e-sunantese-makariou-kissinger-stis-2-oktobriou-1974-dialuei-pollous-muthous/?fbclid=IwY2xjawTOBvxleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEegLgKpExEKHrRwtmZfhwv-dhCNYOg_c_kcfYRr9xW4YewQ5tklM4J71V0mYg_aem_CO-YofFb3MtNi850p0v9rA

ΚΥΠΡΟΣ 1974 ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΩ : ΤΟ ΜΕΓΑΛΟ ΑΦΙΕΡΩΜΑ ΜΕΣΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΑΡΧΕΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΩΝΙΑΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΠΙΣΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙΜΗ ΤΩΝ ΝΕΚΡΩΝ,ΤΩΝ 1619 ΑΓΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ

Σχόλιο Αιώνιας Ελληνικής Πίστης : Σήμερα ο χρόνος μας γυρνάει πίσω 52 χρόνια.Μιά μαύρη ημέρα για τον ελληνισμό.Η Εισβολή του Αττίλα στο νησί της Αφροδίτης.Την Κύπρο μας.Γιά μάς τους Έλληνες θα μάς πονάει αλλά παράλληλα θα μας θυμίζει ότι δεν πρέπει η φωνή να σωπάσει.Δεν πρέπει η πίστη να σταματήσει.Όπου κι αν είμαστε θα το φωνάζουμε.ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΩ Η ΚΥΠΡΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΛΛΑΣ. 

ΕΞΩ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΚΥΠΡΟ ΤΑ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΑ ΤΑΓΜΑΤΑ ΕΙΣΒΟΛΗΣ.

Στα πλαίσια αυτού του γεγονότος η Αιώνια Ελληνική Πίστη κάνει ένα αφιέρωμα μέσα από το αρχείο της (πατήστε στο link)

http://eoniaellhnikhpisti.blogspot.com/search/label/%CE%9A%CE%A5%CE%A0%CE%A1%CE%9F%CE%A3

ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ : ΚΥΠΡΟΣ.

 

ΤΙΜΗ κ ΔΟΞΑ ΣΕ ΟΛΟΥΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΗΡΩΕΣ

Με τιμή 

Βασίλειος Στυλιανέσης 

Αιώνια Ελληνική Πίστη

ΚΥΠΡΟΣ 1974 : ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ-ΦΩΤΙΑ ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΡΟΛΟ ΚΙΣΙΝΓΚΕΡ : ΓΙΑΤΙ ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ ΤΟ 1/3 ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ!

Του Νίκου Μελέτη

Σε μια ακόμη επιβεβαίωση για τον καταστροφικό ρόλο που διαδραμάτισε στο Κυπριακό ο τότε Αμερικανός υπουργός Εξωτερικών Χένρι Κίσινγκερ, είναι τα στοιχεία που αποκαλύπτονται σε απόρρητα, μεχρι πριν λίγο καιρό, έγγραφα του Στέιτ Ντιπάρτμεντ. Το έγγραφο που παρουσιάζουμε σήμερα, καταγράφει τα πρακτικά από την συνάντηση του τότε προέδρου Τζέραλντ Φορντ με τον Χένρι Κίσινγκερ και τον στρατηγό Μπρέντ Σκόουκροφτ του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφάλειας (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security  Affairs), στις 13 Αυγούστου 1974. Ο Κίσινγκερ για πρωτη φορά εμφανίζεται απροκάλυπτα να υποστηρίζει την κατοχή του 1/3 της Κυπρου από τους Τούρκους και συγχρόνως να δηλωνει ότι εάν η Ελλάδα και η Τουρκια έφθαναν σε σύγκρουση, τότε οι ΗΠΑ θα στήριζαν την Τουρκία. Κι όλα αυτά μια ημερα, ή μαλλον λίγες ώρες πριν ξεκινήσει ο Αττίλας 2 με τον οποίο η Τουρκια ολοκλήρωσε την στρατιωτική εισβολή καταλαμβάνοντας το 36,2% του εδάφους της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατιας. Το έγγραφο αναφέρει τα εξής: Κίσινγκερ: Το προβλημα στην Γενεύη είναι ότι οι Τουρκοι βλέπουν ότι  οσο οι διαπραγματεύσεις επεκτείνονται τοσο πιο δύσκολες γίνονται οι μονομερείς στρατιωτικές κινήσεις. Οι Έλληνες χρονοτριβούν -θέλουν να επιστρέψουν στην βαση τους για 36 ωρες και μετα να επαναληφθούν  οι συνομιλιες. Οι Τουρκοι εχουν αρνηθεί να προσφέρουν αυτή  την παράταση, γιατι θα καταστήσει πολύ πιο δύσκολη την ανάληψη μονομερούς δράσης. Προεδρος Φόρντ: Τι θα κάνουμε εάν οι Τούρκοι κανουν την κίνηση; Κίσινγκερ: Θα ψηφίσουμε εναντίον τους στο Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας. Θα πρέπει να είμαστε έτοιμοι να κρατήσουμε τους Έλληνες ώστε να μην πάνε σε πόλεμο. Οι Τούρκοι αυτή τη στιγμή είναι ακραίοι εθνικιστές. Μερικά χρόνια πριν οι τουρκικές τακτικές ήταν ακριβως να αρπάζουν ότι θέλουν και μετα να διαπραγματεύονται στην βάση της κατοχής. Αλλα εάν οι Τούρκοι χαλαρώσουν στην Κύπρο, οι Έλληνες θα γίνουν πιο ανεξέλεγκτοι (χρησιμοποιεί τη λέξη unglued). Εμείς φυσικά δεν θέλουμε έναν πόλεμο μεταξυ των δυο, αλλά εάν φθασουμε σε αυτόν, η Τουρκία είναι πιο σημαντική για εμάς και (οι Τούρκοι) εχουν μια πολιτικη δομή η οποία μπορει να παράξει έναν Κανταφι. (Ο Σκοουκροφτ αποχωρεί για να καλέσει τον Αμερικανό πρέσβη Στην Άγκυρα, Macomber. Επέστρεψε μετα από 10 λεπτά) Κίσινγκερ: Προσπαθούμε να διασώσουμε την  κατάσταση στην Κύπρο  αφου βγηκε εκτος ελέγχου. Οι Βρετανοί τα έκαναν χάλια σε αυτό. Εάν οι Τούρκοι κινηθούν για να πάρουν αυτά που θέλουν τοτε θα καταδικασθούν από το Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας και η Σοβιετική Ένωση θα τους χτυπήσει στο κεφάλι με αυτό. Μερικοί από τους συνάδελφους μου θέλουν να κόψουν την βοήθεια στην Τουρκία. Αυτό θα ηταν μια καταστροφή. Δεν υπάρχει κανένας αμερικανικός λόγος, για να μην έχουν οι Τούρκοι το ένα τρίτο της Κυπρου. Θα κάνουμε μία ανακοίνωση σήμερα για να «βγάλουμε» από την πλάτη μας την εφημερίδα New York Times, αλλά δεν πρέπει να τους στρίψουμε το χέρι… ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ: Τότε η εφημερίδα της Νέας Υόρκης είχε πολλές αποκλειστικές πληροφορίες για την εισβολή στην Κύπρο, με αποτέλεσμα να δημιουργεί σοβαρά προβλήματα στον Χένρι Κίσιγκερ. Στη συνέχεια, ο πρόεδρος Φόρντ, ο Κίσιγκερ και ο Σκόουκροφτ συζητούν για το μείζον θέμα του οπίου, που δημιουργούσε τριβές στις σχέσεις των ΗΠΑ με την Τουρκία. Ο πρόεδρος Ρίτσαρντ Νίξον, πριν παραιτηθεί, είχε γράψει επιστολή στον Μπουλέντ Ετσεβίτ, το οποίο δεν είχε προλάβει να στείλει λόγω της τουρκικής εισβολής και στο μεταξύ είχε παραιτηθεί. Έτσι συζήτησαν να ξαναγραφεί η επιστολή με την υπογραφή του Φόρντ ή του ίδιου του Κίσιγκερ. Ο «μάγος» της διπλωματίας σκέφθηκε για να μην έχει προβλήματα ο Φόρντ με τους Τούρκους να υπογράψει ο ίδιος την επιστολή και στο σημείο αυτό ο τότε Αμερικανός πρόεδρος του απαντά ότι αφού έχεις καλές σχέσεις με τον Ετσεβίτ είναι καλύτερα η επιστολή να υπογραφεί από τον ίδιο. 

ΤΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΤΑ ΑΓΓΛΙΚΑ Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, August 13, 1974, 9 a.m. PARTICIPANTS President Ford Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [General Scowcroft came in late.]2 Kissinger: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating—they want to go home for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much harder to take unilateral action. President: What would we do if the Turks moved? Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right—grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi. [Scowcroft left to call Macomber and returned after about 10 minutes.]3 Kissinger: We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey—that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm. I would like to mention the Turkish poppy issue. President Nixon signed a letter to Ecevit which, because of Cyprus, we have not yet delivered. We could redo the letter for your signature, or I could send it. I think the whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Maybe I should do it. President: The other side of the coin is that you already have very good relations with Ecevit and there would be less damage coming from me. Kissinger: Let’s wait a bit. If we come out of the Cyprus thing all right, we will have more leverage. The Turks can’t focus on it now anyway. President: Yes. Let’s wait a bit. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Πηγή:  https://hellasjournal.com/2018/08/eggrafo-fotia-apokalyptei-ton-rolo-kisingker-giati-na-min-echoyn-oi-toyrkoi-to-1-3-tis-kyproy/

ΤΟ ΕΝΩΤΙΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ 

Η ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΤΟ 1974 - ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΑΡΧΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ STATE DEPARTMENT (Β' ΜΕΡΟΣ)

Του Κωνσταντίνου Δημητριάδη

 

 

Διαβάστε το 1ο Μέρος εδώ : https://eoniaellhnikhpisti.blogspot.com/2019/08/1974-state-department.html

 

Καταγραφή τηλεφωνικής συνομιλίας μεταξύ Dr.H.Kissinger (Υπ.Εξ. Η.Π.Α.) και K.Waldheim (Γ.Γ. του Ο.Η.Ε.) της 16-7-1974

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976
Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 87

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87. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and United Nations Secretary General Waldheim¹1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Waldheim was in New York.

July 16, 1974, 11:50 a.m.

W: This is Waldheim speaking.

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Mr. Secretary, I am grateful for you returning my call. The reason is, you have probably heard from Buffum, that we have a serious development and I wanted to inform you of a cable that we have received. This would give a clear picture of the situation. I received from my special representative and Commander in Chief in Cyprus—I don't know if you have been informed by Buffum.

K: I think Sisco has told me about it.

W: MAKARIOS may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss, what he terms, Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know four members of the Greek Government are being treated for wounds received during the coup d'etat in the last two days, so there was some involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military contingent is involved. And he also asked me to convey to you and others to help keep Cyprus independent and sovereign. I sent a message to the government of Athens and Ankara stressing the importance of maintaining…

K: I notice the Greek Government has affirmed this.

W: Yes, the important thing is, well it is not so important, but that the Archbishop asked that the British send a helicopter to evacuate him to a British base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted this on the condition that the Archbishop would accept evacuation to the United Kingdom and in the meantime, our commander in chief there has asked for protection, so MAKARIOS refused to evacuate the island and I have now authorized our commander in chief to grant protection. Of course, that will cause problems in the future. This will be a problem.

K: Yes.

W: This is most important information which I got this morning. I asked Rossides whether he will ask for a meeting of the Council. He did not…I consultated with the President of the Council and we decided there should be a meeting at 3:00 this afternoon. The situation is very confused and all kinds of rumors around the world and I think it is important that the Council be informed.

K: I appreciate this very much and your information is later than ours.

K: I talked with Callaghan who reports they were evacuating MAKARIOS and that didn't sound right to me.²2. See Document 86 and footnote 3 thereto.

W: I agree. But for us it will be a problem if the new military government is in control and no President is sworn-in, then we have a problem of what to do with MAKARIOS.

K: How about you and I talking tomorrow and exchanging information then.

W: Yes. I think it is important to avoid intervention by the Turks. Our information is that the Turks… will report that they will not provide or do anything which could create deterioration of the situation, but this is the real danger.

K: We are dealing with the Turks today and I will keep you informed and I understand we are going to get together next week or soon.

W: Yes. I want to talk to you.

K: Very nice to talk to you and I appreciate your keeping me informed.

W: If I hear anything else I will let you know immediately.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Waldheim was in New York.
² See Document 86 and footnote 3 thereto.


Τηλεγράφημα του κ.Τάσκα προς τον H.Kissinger με ενημέρωση από την συνομιλία που είχε με τον Ιωαννίδη το απόγευμα της 16-7-1974

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976
Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 88

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88. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USNATO. A handwritten note by Clift, presumably to Scowcroft, reads, “Read this one in detail!”

Athens, July 16, 1974, 1645Z.

4528. Subject: Cyprus Coup: Meeting with General Ioannides. Ref: State 152379.²2. Document 82. For the Secretary.
1. I used secure reliable channel directly to General Ioannides to deliver message reftel. He began by explaining he had personal message from USG. After emissary had read two paragraphs, Ioannides commented message must be same as that Ambassador had given Kypreos, in which case emissary wasting his time since he would receive message anyway. Emissary explained his job was to finish reading message and hand it to him and would do so, to which General Ioannides said fine.
2. After emissary completed message, the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says “consistent with the above principles …” and threatens interference. “No matter what happened in Cyprus I (Ioannides) will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the Communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July 1974 Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists”.
3. General then calmed down, came over to where emissary was sitting and said he knew he understood him: diplomatic talk is time-consuming but he would answer in as diplomatic fashion as possible because he had diplomatic mission.
4. General stated that Greece also believed in non-interference and in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus; Greece would abide by the decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom were nationalists, and these nationalists were the ones who had moved against MAKARIOS. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. At this point he went off on a tangent stating that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots had asked for enosis, that GOT had obviously accepted these developments in Cyprus, that Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair.
5. According to Ioannides only real resistance left on Cyprus were Communist supporters of MAKARIOS in Paphos; these supporters were even singing EAM/ELAS³3. Reference is to the Greek Communist resistance movement of World War II. songs. Most of the rest of island was in nationalist hands. General Ioannides stated that everyone should forget that MAKARIOS was an international figure, that he was a national hero, that he had served several useful functions and that he was a man of the cloth; MAKARIOS had become a rotten priest homosexual; he was perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate and the owner of half the hotels on the island. To preserve his position and to continue his activities, MAKARIOS was willing to sacrifice seventy per cent of the Greek Cypriot population (only thirty per cent were AKEL) and entire anti-Communist Turkish Cypriot population. Ioannides asserted Greek Cypriots in National Guard realized these facts and had begged motherland for chance to act against MAKARIOS; General claimed that he only assisted after being presented with a fait accompli.
6. At this point emissary interjected and told Ioannides point-blank that, with coup only twenty-four hours after his reporting to us regarding a possible overthrow of Makarios this was very difficult for anyone to believe. At this point the General again blew up with arms waving, knocked over the same table, broke a second glass and, between obscenities, stated that he did not plot and arrange the coup, initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July, after latter learned that GOG intended to accede to MAKARIOS' demands to reduce number of Greek officers in National Guard. General stated he could not accept at least 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from MAKARIOS ' tyranny. This coupled with MAKARIOS' anti-regime efforts, made him decide to assist Greek Cypriot nationalists. The General stated that if Makarios succeeded in kicking Greeks out of Cyprus what could keep him from thinking he could not kick junta out of Greece. After deciding to assist Greek Cypriots, the General claimed that he did not tell the Armed Forces leadership nor any Greek official. He limited knowledge of his intentions to few select officers on 13/14 July; no one else knew and even after events unfolded on 15 July only a handful of people were aware of his role. Ioannides justified this action by asserting that if he had briefed numerous people they would have raised suggestions, advice, alternatives, and possible problems. He added that he acted on spur of the moment.
7. Ioannides declared that game was now over for MAKARIOS, that Greek Cypriots had booted him out, that National Guard and Greek officers had assisted nationalist Greek Cypriot brothers, and that only resistance now was in Paphos. In reply to emissary's direct question Ioannides stated that MAKARIOS was still alive “but who cares; he now has no power and no one, if he believes in principle of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign nation will assist him—not even the Russians unless Turks ask them to do so and the Turks just don't care.”
8. In reply to question whether Greeks were in direct touch with Turks, General stated we have not bothered the Turks; we have not declared enosis. Turks agree that “the principal thorn” (i.e., MAKARIOS) is gone and, “I am not in touch with the Turks.” He expressed view that Greece and Turkey could now proceed at some future time to sit down, talk and solve their differences. Indeed, according to Ioannides Greeks might even be willing to share profits of petroleum finds in a joint exploration company; however, Greece would never surrender Aegean continental shelf because this would mean Turkish control of Greek islands. He also expressed belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could probably solve their difficulties peacefully, quietly and amicably. He even joked that in a year or perhaps more realistically ten, the Turks might want to sell their share of Cyprus for increased percentage of petroleum rights. Again in reply to direct question, General Ioannides stated that he was not in contact with any Turkish official; however, he added that Turks were “officially aware” that enosis was not the objective at this point and that Greek Cypriots did not intend any bloody action against Turk Cypriots.
9. When asked for specifics on MAKARIOS, Ioannides stated that according to Greek information, MAKARIOS was alive and in hands of British at Episkopi Base; he had gone there with assistance of Canadians and British on island.
10. At this point Ioannides summed up as follows:
A) He stressed that he too had a God; he was definitely not anti-American; “even a jackass needed a post to be tied to” and in his case it was the U.S.
B) His hasty decision on 13 July might have been stupid. Instead of abandoning Cyprus and letting U.S. worry about its fate and pour money down another rathole, he had allowed love of country, a moral obligation to the Greek Cypriot nationalists and his “philotimo” to overrule logic and to assist Greek Cypriots.
C) Greece would do whatever was necessary to preserve its national identity and to stay anti-Communist. If this meant keeping Yiaros open it would stay open as long as it was necessary and he would accept no static from anyone on this score. Indeed, he had instructed a Greek official to tell British officially that whenever the British let Irish political prisoners out of British jails, he would free the forty-two Greek political prisoners on Yiaros.
D) He personally didn't like Nikos Sampson, but that was Greek Cypriot nationalist decision. He knew Sampson personally and in his opinion Sampson was “crazy.” He jokingly remarked that new Cypriot Minister of Defense Dimitriou was very pro-American and that our Embassy there would soon realize this. He also knew Dimitriou personally.
E) While shaking hands at close of conversation Ioannides stated, “Remember we too believe in a free, independent and sovereign Cyprus, we too believe in non-interference, along with Turks and especially with Kissinger. We too believe that the Cypriots should be free to solve their own problems, be they Greek Cypriots, Turk Cypriots or both.”

Tasca

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USNATO. A handwritten note by Clift, presumably to Scowcroft, reads, “Read this one in detail!”
² Document 82.
³ Reference is to the Greek Communist resistance movement of World War II.

ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΑΔΗΣ ΜΑΥΡΟΣΚΟΥΦΗΣ
ΑΙΩΝΙΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΠΙΣΤΗ

Η ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΤΟ 1974 - ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΑΡΧΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ STATE DEPARTMENT (Α' ΜΕΡΟΣ)

Του Κωνσταντίνου Δημητριάδη

Όπως έχω γράψει και στην πολύ αναλυτική Έρευνα μου, που εφανίζεται στο παρόν Ιστολόγιό μου, πάνω στην ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ από Ελλαδίτες επίορκους και Ελληνοκύπριους ανεγκέφαλους, οι Αμερικάνοι είχαν κάθε τρόπο και την δύναμη να σταματήσουν τους Τούρκους, καθ' όσον γνώριζαν εκ των προτέρων τις προθέσεις τους.

Δεν το έκαναν (και βέβαια δεν το έκαναν γιατί δεν ήθελαν να το κάνουν)

Αντίθετα έπαιξαν σαν το "ποντίκι με την γάτα" με την Ελληνική διπλωματία, αποποιούμενοι κάθε συμμετοχή, και βέβαια κάθε δυνατότητα παρέμβασής τους προς τους Τούρκους (sic) !

Ο Πρόεδρος της Αιγύπτου Σαντάτ είχε εκμυστηρευτεί μετά το Πραξικόπημα και την πρώτη φάση της Εισβολής στον Μακάριο τον Γ' : το κλειδί γιά την λύση της κρίσης είναι στην Ουάσιγκτων και είναι στα χέρια του Dr.Kissinger !

Από τα αρχεία του State Department που βγήκαν στην δημοσιότητα φαίνεται καθαρά ο ρόλος του Αμερικανικού επικεφαλής του Dr.Henry Kissinger και του Αμερικανικού Πενταγώνου σε αυτό που σήμερα ονομάζουμε "τετελεσμένα στην Κύπρο"!

Επειδή ακόμα και έγκριτοι Συγγραφείς και Αναλυτές έχουν μιά συγκεχυμένη άποψη γιά τον ρόλο του Αμερικανικού παράγοντα στις τότε εξελίξεις, αποφάσισα από σήμερα να βγάζω στο blog μου ένα original κείμενο (δυστυχώς είναι στην Αγγλική) , από τα αρχεία του State Department (τα οποία είναι πέραν πάσης αμφιβολίας ακριβή - και αυτό φαίνεται ότι σε μερικά σημεία δεν έχει γίνει η αποδεσμευση του επίσημου κειμένου - όπου όποιος έχει την δυνατότητα να το διαβάσει, αντιλαμβάνεται πολλά πράγματα από αυτά που έγιναν τότε (αντιλαμβάνεται πολύ περισσότερα πράγματα από τις "κραυγές" του ενός και του άλλου που αγωνίζονται να αποδείξουν ότι ο προδότης είναι ο ...¨άλλος" ).

ΕΛΠΙΖΩ ΝΑ ΠΙΑΣΕΙ ΤΟΠΟ ΑΥΤΗ Η ΝΕΑ ΠΡΟΣΠΑΘΕΙΑ ΜΟΥ ΠΟΥ ΜΟΝΟ ΣΚΟΠΟ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΜΟΝΟ ΤΗΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ.

Το πρώτο κείμενο είναι το τηλεγράφημα που έλαβε ο Κίσσινγκερ από την Πρεσβεία του στην Άγκυρα στις 15-7-1974.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976
Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 85

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85. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, USUN, USNMRSHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, and USCINCEUR.

Ankara, July 15, 1974, 2330Z.

5589. Ref: Athens 4493, 4494.²2. In telegram 4493 from Athens, July 15, especially paragraphs 6–10, Tasca urged reiterating the U.S. interest in maintaining peace between Greece and Turkey and finding a long-term settlement for Cyprus. To that end, Tasca suggested promoting the return to the democratic structure just overthrown in Cyprus by concluding the intercommunal talks and arranging early elections, and he also envisioned a continuing role for the UN. Tasca thought that the United States should reiterate its opposition to violence as a solution, enlist the assistance of NATO allies and Secretary General Luns, and consult with the British regarding their reaction to the events. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974) Telegram 4494 is printed as Document 81.

1. Turkish policy on the Cyprus coup is still evolving. Yet two judgments which will be important as USG moves to prevent spread of conflict and protect its own interests can now be suggested with some confidence:

(A) GOT will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist and emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy.

(B) Until so convinced, GOT likely attempt lay responsibility for action on Geneva signatories, UN, NATO, and US—unless Turk Cypriots come to suffer substantially, in which case direct action of some kind would again be likely.

2. Other, more subtle, choices and actions will probably for time being seem less important to Turks than to Greeks, Cypriots themselves, NATO, UN, and even Russians: e.g. comparative virtues MAKARIOS (if he is still alive) and Clerides, reinforcement or not of the Turkish contingent, role of UNFICYP, etc. At same time, GOT will continue deeply suspicious of Ioannides government and Ankara is already clearly very fearful that any government led by Sampson is an enosis government. For these reasons and because of its own political necessity, the GOT can be expected to undertake military alerts and troop movements within Turkey which will inevitably increase tension even while it awaits international action.

3. In this situation, we see first sine qua non for the prevention of intra-NATO fighting as the blocking by all means available to the US of enosis or anything that looks like it. Second is the prevention of significant hurt to Turkish Cypriots. In terms of avoiding Greek-Turk clash, these two, we think, are even more important than stopping a civil war between Greeks on Cyprus. After achievement these two objectives comes series of goals set forth paras 6–10 Athens 4493, with which we wholeheartedly concur. We will refine our thoughts on these and other ideas in Athens 4493 and submit ASAP.³3. In telegram 5609 from Ankara, July 16, Macomber urged a concentrated effort to diffuse the Cyprus situation for fear of an armed Turkish intervention. Turkey viewed the coup as a major step toward enosis, a violation of the 1960 agreements, and a product of Hellenic (not Greek Cypriot) officers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

Spain

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, USUN, USNMRSHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, and USCINCEUR.
² In telegram 4493 from Athens, July 15, especially paragraphs 6–10, Tasca urged reiterating the U.S. interest in maintaining peace between Greece and Turkey and finding a long-term settlement for Cyprus. To that end, Tasca suggested promoting the return to the democratic structure just overthrown in Cyprus by concluding the intercommunal talks and arranging early elections, and he also envisioned a continuing role for the UN. Tasca thought that the United States should reiterate its opposition to violence as a solution, enlist the assistance of NATO allies and Secretary General Luns, and consult with the British regarding their reaction to the events. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974) Telegram 4494 is printed as Document 81.
³ In telegram 5609 from Ankara, July 16, Macomber urged a concentrated effort to diffuse the Cyprus situation for fear of an armed Turkish intervention. Turkey viewed the coup as a major step toward enosis, a violation of the 1960 agreements, and a product of Hellenic (not Greek Cypriot) officers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

(*) GOT = Government of Turkey

Σύσκεψη του Συμβουλίου Ειδικών Ενεργειών των ΗΠΑ υπό την προεδρία του Dr.Henry Kissinger την 16-7-1974 (την επομένη του Πραξικοπήματος)

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976
Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 86

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86. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

Washington, July 16, 1974, 10:36–11:20 a.m.

• SUBJECT
• Cyprus

• PARTICIPANTS
• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
• Robert Ingersoll
• Joseph Sisco
• Robert McCloskey
• Wells Stabler
• Thomas D. Boyatt
• Defense
• William Clements
• Robert Ellsworth
• Harry Bergold
• JCS
• Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly
• CIA
• William Colby
• George Lauder
• NSC Staff
• Richard T. Kennedy
• Harold H. Saunders
• Rosemary Niehuss
• James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

• —that the two U.S. naval task forces now in the Mediterranean would remain out of ports, in a holding position;
• —that Ambassador Tasca ask President Ioannides for an unambiguous statement on Greek intentions toward Cyprus;
• —that the Turkish Government be asked what they want to prevent on Cyprus;
• —that our assessment of the situation be sent to relevant diplomatic posts; and
• —CIA would prepare a situation report on the status of forces on Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing for us?
Mr. Colby began briefing from the attached text.²2. Not attached and not found.
Secretary Kissinger: What time? (In reference to the scheduled meeting of the UN Security Council.)
Mr. Colby: Sometime this afternoon, I think 3:00 p.m.
Mr. Sisco: Before Bill goes on I would like to bring you up to date with some later information. I was just on the phone to Buffum in New York. USUN has been informed that Weckman (the Special UN Representative on Cyprus) saw MAKARIOS this morning—talked to him. MAKARIOS said that the British had offered him (MAKARIOS) protection and evacuation to any place he wanted to go. MAKARIOS refused, but asked for UN protection. Waldheim is planning to convene the UNSC this afternoon to deal with this request.
Secretary Kissinger: I just talked to (British Foreign Minister) Callaghan on the phone five minutes ago.³3. Kissinger phoned Callaghan at 10:15 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) He says that MAKARIOS has accepted—wants British protection. From what I understand, the British are flying him to the aircraft carrier Hermes and then to Malta. He was asking whether we had any ideas on where MAKARIOS could be taken next. Everyone, at least now, agrees that MAKARIOS is alive.
Mr. Sisco: Well, our information seems to be conflicting. I would think that the Callaghan information is more reliable.
Secretary Kissinger: I told him (Mr. Callaghan) the line we were taking and he said go easy on the legitimate government issue because MAKARIOS is leaving the island.
Mr. Colby continued to brief.
Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they mean by this? (In reference to plans for a special Turk parliamentary meeting to be held July 18.)
Mr. Colby: It could mean that they intend to move their forces to Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger: I just can't believe that. I just can't believe they want MAKARIOS back in power.
Mr. Sisco: The Turks would intervene to (a) protect the Turk Cypriot community and (b) to prevent enosis from taking place.
Secretary Kissinger: It just seems inconceivable to me that they would support him (MAKARIOS).
Mr. Colby continued to brief.
Secretary Kissinger: They are moving in an easterly direction away from Cyprus? (In reference to Mr. Colby's briefing on Soviet fleet movements.)
Mr. Colby: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: What kind of forces do we have in the Eastern Mediterranean now?
Gen. Pauly: There are two main task forces. One has the aircraft carrier Forrestal with it and the other is an amphibious task force. That group is located south of Crete. The task force with the Forrestal in it is now somewhere between Crete and Athens. There are other small elements around, but those are the two main task forces. We've told them all to remain out of the ports, in a holding position and to be prepared for a 24 hour lead time in case they are needed.
Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we ought to do anything with them now, even if the Soviet ships are moving, am I right?
Mr. Sisco: Definitely. They are close enough anyway if we have to call on them. They are in a holding pattern and can be moved quickly. Besides, any movement might be seen as attempts to internationalize the situation. Holding is consistent with our policy.
Mr. Colby resumed his briefing which touched on the Greek-Turk Aegean dispute…
Secretary Kissinger: Let's finish with Cyprus first.
(to Mr. Clements) Bill, do you have any views?
Mr. Clements: Only that I think we ought to keep the forces where they are. No movement.
Gen. Pauly: I agree.
Mr. Sisco: I suggest we continue to maintain a low profile, remain cautious. Anything else at this time would be counterproductive. The situation is as murky today as yesterday. We just don't know what's going on. First, if the UK provides MAKARIOS protection, that changes the situation. Second, we need to provide some guidance for today's UN meeting. Also, Henry, we need some guidance on what to do about recognition.
Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) I don't understand what you said earlier about the UN. What's happening at the UN?
Mr. Sisco: Well, in general, the way I understand it, the Secretary General will make this report to the Security Council. It's scheduled to meet at 3:00 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger: Is (Ambassador) Scali there?
Mr. Sisco: Yes. I believe it will be Rossides (the Cypriot UN representative), who represents MAKARIOS, who will raise the question. He will say that they will ask for the UN to support MAKARIOS consistent with UN resolutions. The Soviets will jump in.
Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump. We have to look at the possibility of (1) civil war and the role of MAKARIOS forces or (2) the Sampson regime establishes control with MAKARIOS off the island. I think we ought to be careful that we don't provide the Soviets the excuse to legitimatize the situation. I propose that in the noon briefing, if asked about recognition, we say that the issue has not arisen, or something like that. But, we do not want to be positive about who we do recognize. If MAKARIOS is off the island, this might raise the Soviet angle.
Mr. Clements: That sounds reasonable to me. This UN thing concerns me, however. I mean, it could be a stamp of endorsement that would be premature from our standpoint.
Mr. Sisco: I agree.
Secretary Kissinger: Our first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized. We need to put stronger pressure on Athens, and today. We must get our Ambassador in to see the President, or Prime Minister, or whoever it is, and get our views across forcibly. We've got to get somebody in there who will ask the Greeks for a statement of their intentions. [1 line not declassified] We want an unambiguous statement of Greek intentions towards Cyprus from him. We want to defuse the Turk angle. They mainly want to prevent enosis. If civil war develops then we'll have to assess the situation then. As far as the public line is concerned, we can say that the recognition issue just hasn't arisen. Tomorrow we can decide on the internal situation when we know just where MAKARIOS is. Callaghan can't be wrong.
Mr. Ellsworth: I might suggest that (Ambassador) Macomber also say something to the Turks. There has not been enough attention here to Turkey. It really fears the new Cypriot government.
Secretary Kissinger: O.K., but what should he say? Ask what they want to achieve.
Mr. Sisco: We need to make the point with Greece not to fool around with this troop rotation tomorrow.
Mr. Ellsworth: Something like, “don't do anything”, just play it cool.
Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Colby: I don't want to use it, but the Ambassador is insisting on it.
Mr. Lauder: [1 line not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: Let's get the word to Ioannidis. I don't care which way, but do it.
Mr. Sisco: Ambassador Tasca should go see Ioannidis and tell him what we said yesterday.
Secretary Kissinger: Right.
Mr. Ingersoll: There is also a protocol problem of a reception for military attachés in Athens in a few hours. We should get a cable out to them for some guidance.
Mr. Clements: What's this you're talking about?
Mr. Stabler: It's the annual reception for military attachés that the Greek Government is holding this afternoon.
Mr. Sisco: The question is, should all of them go—I think there are 12—or only a few?
Secretary Kissinger: I think we should cut it down a bit. Tell the top man not to go. Second-level our attendance.
Mr. Clements: O.K.
Secretary Kissinger: We should also write an assessment of the situation and send it to the various posts. Ambassador Davies in particular, and cut the number of attachés to the reception to about four. What do you want to do at the UN?
Mr. Sisco: Providing the British information is correct, we ought to try to slow or deflect it. We should tell Scali to limit this round to what they want to say. Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey will certainly want to say something. We can be sure of that. They can go ahead and have their say, but we should say nothing. All we should say is that we support the territorial integrity of Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger: Good. I agree.
Mr. Colby: There is a good chance that resistance will develop on the island if the Turks invade.
Secretary Kissinger: What, MAKARIOS and the Communists? But if he (MAKARIOS) is off the island, it seems to me resistance would collapse.
Mr. Sisco: If he remains on the island, there is a better chance, I agree. MAKARIOS in the past has had Communist support. He also has a broad-based popular support.
Ambassador McCloskey: That's right, in past elections MAKARIOS has received upwards of 95 percent of the vote—in honest elections.
Secretary Kissinger: At issue here is what is the balance of forces if a civil war develops. If the organized forces are Communist, it's an entirely different situation than if they are not.
Mr. Sisco: What are the political leanings of MAKARIOS' Tactical Reserve Forces?
Mr. Boyatt: They are basically pro-Makarios. They are certainly not Communist.
Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a basis on which to move until the situation clarifies. It's too complicated at this point. When talking to Callaghan, I could give him no ideas on what to do with MAKARIOS. I just don't think it is in his (MAKARIOS') interest to leave the island.
Mr. Clements: What is the size of the organized forces there, again?
Mr. Colby: There are 950 regular Greek forces, 650 Greek officers in the National Guard, and about 6,000 total forces on the island.
Mr. Sisco: Through the London-Turkish agreement the Greeks have a right to station officers on the island.
Secretary Kissinger: Our objectives as I see it are: (1) to prevent the internationalization of the situation, and (2) if civil war develops to conduct ourselves so that the Communists aren't encouraged to exploit the situation. The first thing we have got to do is decouple the Greeks, and do it today. We also have to get the Turks to stay out of it. If he (MAKARIOS) is indeed leaving, it seems to me that organized resistance will collapse. Callaghan told me it was at MAKARIOS' initiative to leave. Callaghan said that MAKARIOS asked to be moved to a British Sovereign Base and from there to Malta. I just don't understand his reasons for not staying.
Mr. Boyatt: I can't either. It's quite unlike him. He has guts, and this I don't understand.
Secretary Kissinger: One thing we cannot accurately assess is what paramilitary forces are going to do. History has proved this. We have to see what develops on the island before we can really do anything. I see no problem on the recognition thing. We don't want to recognize Sampson. He's just a figurehead anyway, isn't he?
Mr. Stabler: That's right. If asked, we should just say that the question of recognition just hasn't arisen.
Mr. Colby continued to brief on the implication of the Aegean dispute.
Secretary Kissinger: Do we have anybody who can talk to the Turks?
Mr. Ellsworth: I've got some contacts in New York. I would like to get their assessment of the situation.
Secretary Kissinger: Can Macomber see Ecevit?
Mr. Sisco: Sure.
(At this point the Secretary was handed a cable from which he read.)⁴4. Telegram 8934 from London, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan has just reported that MAKARIOS is now in a Sovereign Base Area. He is not off the island yet. I had better call Callaghan and get some clarification because we can't make a judgment until we know the status of MAKARIOS. We need to get a better view of the ground situation on the island. Can I get that from you (to Mr. Colby)?
Mr. Colby: You can have what we have, but it isn't much.
Secretary Kissinger: We have to find out what the situation on the ground is first, then we can decide who we will support.
Mr. Colby: We aren't getting much information. We are getting some traffic now on military moves, but it isn't much.
Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) Give me a situation report by the end of the day. Today we will concentrate our moves on Athens and Turkey. We want a clear reading on what the Turks want. Tomorrow we can take up the internal situation.
Mr. Clements: What are the Greeks doing? What is their objective in this?
Mr. Colby: They want to take over the country. They think that MAKARIOS is nothing but a bloody Communist.
Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep the Turks and the Soviets out of this. We must see how the internal situation on Cyprus evolves.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
² Not attached and not found.
³ Kissinger phoned Callaghan at 10:15 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
⁴ Telegram 8934 from London, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

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